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GOOD SPORTS, BAD SPORTS: THE DISTRICT COURT
ABANDONS COLLEGE ATHLETES IN ROSS V.
CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY
I. INTRODUCTION
College athletics are in a state of crisis. While college athletics are
increasing in popularity and achieving revenue levels unparalleled in
their history,' a nationwide travesty of corruption at all levels of revenue-
producing intercollegiate sports has been discovered over the past dec-
ade. From recruiting violations2 to athletes receiving illegal gifts and
payments,3 from grade falsification4 to substance abuse,5 college athletics
1. CBS Pays $1 Billion for NCAA, Newsday, Nov. 22, 1989, (Sports), at 157. The most
recent television contract signed in 1989 between the NCAA and Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem ("CBS") sports for exclusive coverage of the NCAA's men's college basketball tourna-
ment pays the NCAA $1 billion over 7 years. The package also includes rights to televise
other college events, such as women's college basketball and some track, gymnastics, and vol-
leyball events, but the men's basketball tournament is by far the most popular event of the
package. CBS sports president Neal Pilson said "The NCAA was a business transaction that
made tremendously good sense... We anticipate making money on the tournament." Id The
previous contract between CBS and the NCAA paid $166 million over three years. Id CBS
has paid the College Football Association ("CFA") $64 million over the 1987-1990 period for
the television rights to its games. Id. ABC will pay the Big Ten and Pacific Ten $66 million for
the rights to its football games between 1990-1995. Id.
It is ironic that with all this income most university athletic programs lose money. The
most financially benefitted parties seem to be star coaches and athletic directors, who are paid
handsomely. One reason programs are currently losing money is because of an "arms race"
mentality between schools, spending large sums to pay coaches salaries and build new stadi-
ums and arenas. See Sherman, Dick Schultz A Man on a Mission, There's no Rest for the
NCAA Boss in his Battle for Reform, Chicago Tribune, July 1, 1990, (Sports), Zone C, at 3.
2. For a case arising out of extensive recruiting violations in a college basketball program,
see National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). In Tarkanian,
University of Nevada at Las Vegas basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian challeged the lack of due
process standards in the NCAA investigation of the university athletic program, which re-
sulted in a finding of 38 university violations of NCAA rules. Tarkanian was found to have
committed 10 of these violations, including obstructing the NCAA investigation. Id. at 186.
The Court held that NCAA investigations and sanctions do not constitute state action, and are
not subject to the requirements of the 14th Amendment. Id. at 199.
3. A recent example involved the discovery of $1000 cash which allegedly fell out of an
Emery Air Freight envelope sent from an assistant coach of the University of Kentucky to the
father of high school basketball star Chris Mills. See Baker, He's Expressing Himself Nicely;
Arizona Transfer Mills Still Taunted, But Has Shown He Can Play, L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1991,
§ C, at 1, col. 2. In his book CAUGHT IN THE NET, former Clemson Coach Tates Locke
describes the secret slush fund created by alumni boosters to provide money to basketball
players and their families. T. Locke, CAUGHT IN THE NET, excerpted in SPORT AND HIGHER
EDUCATION, 69-80, at 73-75. (D. Chu ed. 1985).
4. See infra note 100.
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have received substantial negative attention. Among the various abuses
occurring, the phenomenon of a high percentage of college athletes fail-
ing to graduate or acquire any meaningful education while in college
stands out. This occurrence, known as athletic exploitation, goes to the
core of the purpose and meaning of college athletics, and the defined role
of the student-athlete as a member of the student body.6
The National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), the gov-
erning body of college athletics, has promulgated rules of conduct and
meted out punishments in an attempt to remedy the abuses in college
athletics. Throughout the 1980s, the NCAA has instituted reforms
aimed at cleaning up college sports. These reforms, however, have fo-
cused on entrance requirements and punishments for NCAA member
schools, rather than on directly protecting student athletes or providing
standards for the educational needs of academically deficient athletes.
In Ross v. Creighton University7 ("Ross"), Kevin Ross, a former col-
lege basketball player, sued his school for alleged athletic exploitation.
This Note will discuss the failure of the federal district court to create a
tort precedent in the Ross case, where a college basketball player at-
tended school and played intercollegiate basketball for four years despite
academic scores that would not have allowed him to be admitted as a
regular student. Ross failed to graduate or achieve any meaningful edu-
cation. This Note will argue that the federal district court looked at the
wrong policies in deciding that the player had no tort claim against the
5. In a 1989 NCAA survey of 2300 athletes, 5% reported using anabolic steroids. Most
of the respondents were football players, but men and women participating in eight other
sports also admitted using the muscle enhancing drug. See Survey Reports Slight Increase in
Steroid Use, L.A. Times, Oct. 17, 1989, § C, at 2, col. 1. Brian Bosworth, a number one draft
pick of the Seattle Seahawks in 1987, admitted using steroids as a player at the University of
Oklahoma. See Wright, As an NFL Player, Bosworth Was All Mouth and No Heart, L.A.
Times, July 18, 1990, § P, at 11, col. 1 (late final ed.). In the aftermath of University of
Southern California quarterback Todd Marinovich's arrest for cocaine and marijuana posses-
sion in early 1991, many current and former Trojan players claimed that players had been
cheating on school drug tests for years. In one alleged method players procured "clean" urine
from other players or students, strapped it to their bodies in plastic bags, and used it during
required drug tests. The players resorted to cheating to avoid detection of their drug use. One
former player explained, stating -[c]oke, [cocaine], they were all hiding coke." See Systematic
Cheating on Drug Tests at USC, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1991, § C at 1, col. 1. In its subsequent
investigation of the L.A. Times story, USC has claimed the alleged cheating never occurred.
See Almond, USC No Evidence of Cheating; Drug Testing: Review Committee Conducts Inter-
views with Athletes and Finds no Wrongdoing in School Program, but Some Procedures are
Questioned, L.A. Times, Feb. 21, 1991, § C, at 1, col. 6.
6. NCAA CONST. art. 2.4, reprinted in MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATH-
LETIC ASSOCIATION, 1990-91 [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL], defines the student-athlete as an
integral member of the student body.
7. 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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university for educational misfeasance. This Note will also argue that a
tort cause of action would stimulate NCAA reform to directly protect
the student-athlete's right to be educated during his or her playing eligi-
bility, while able to benefit from the players' athletic scholarship.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts
Kevin Ross was an outstanding high school basketball player in
Kansas City, Kansas.8 In 1978, Creighton University in Nebraska re-
cruited Ross and gave him a basketball scholarship to begin after he
graduated high school later that year. Creighton offered the scholarship
despite that Ross scored a nine out of a possible thirty-six on his college
entrance American College Test ("ACT").9 The incoming class that
year averaged 23.2 on the same exam.1" Although his scores were low
and his reading skills were well below the junior high level, Ross at-
tended Creighton University and played intercollegiate basketball for the
school for four years, until his eligibility expired." Ross did not gradu-
ate. He achieved only ninety-six out of the required 128 credits toward
graduation at Creighton, finishing with a "D" average. 12 Ross' curricu-
lum at Creighton included such courses as "ceramics, marksmanship,
and the respective theories of basketball, track and field, and football."'
13
According to the Ross opinion, "[u]nder its rules, the university would
not have accepted the pursuit of this esoteric curriculum by a non-ath-
lete.' 4  After losing his eligibility after the 1982 season, Creighton
placed Ross in the renowned Westside Preparatory School ("Westside
Prep") in Chicago, which had noted success in educating underprivileged
kids.' 5 Creighton paid Ross' $6500 yearly tuition. The Ross court de-
scribed Ross' reading level at the time of entering Westside Prep as that
of a seventh grader, and his overall language ability as that of a fourth
grader.16 Other accounts place his reading and language ability levels
8. Id. at 1322.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Ross v. Creighton University, 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1322.
13. Id. (citing Ross' third amended complaint).
14. Id.
15. Id. See also Curry, Suing for a Second Chance to Start Over, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
1990, § B, at 9, col. 2 (hereinafter "Curry"). Westside Prep was founded by noted black
educator Marva Collins, and stresses basic skills achievement.
16. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1322.
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much lower. 17 At Westside Prep, Ross shared classes with children read-
ing at elementary grade levels.18
At Westside Prep, Ross made substantial academic progress and
became a national symbol of the fight against illiteracy and the failure of
the college athletic system. In one year he increased his reading ability to
the twelfth grade level. 9 Ross appeared on television talk shows and
news shows such as "Face the Nation."2 His life was the basis of a
television movie." He testified before Congress on the subject of illiter-
acy,22 and toured the lecture circuit at major universities and organiza-
tions, speaking on illiteracy and his experiences in school.23
Ross graduated from Westside Prep in 1983, at the age of twenty-
four.24 At this point, Creighton terminated its financial commitment to
Ross' further education. 25 Ross attempted further college education in
the Chicago area, but due to financial hardship he was unable to achieve
a degree.26
Once his education ceased, Ross began to experience psychological
problems.27 He had difficulty finding work and began to abuse alcohol.28
Ross' problems reached a crisis point on the morning of July 23, 1987,
when he barricaded himself in his eighth floor room at the Quality Inn
Hotel in downtown Chicago and began tearing apart the room, throwing
furniture and other objects out the window.29 Ross held the police at bay
for hours, finally giving up after speaking with Marva Collins, the head
of Westside Prep, who had become his friend and mentor.3" Ross was
ultimately ordered to pay $7500 restitution to the hotel.3'
As a result of the hotel rampage, Ross sued Creighton University in
the Cook County Circuit Court in 1989, claiming breach of contract,
17. Various newspaper and magazine accounts place Ross' reading level at the 2nd grade
level when he entered Westside Prep. See Curry, supra note 15, and Smith & Wattley, College
Athlete Beat Illiteracy, Not Frustrations, Chicago Tribune, July 24, 1987, Chicagoland section,
Zone C, at I (hereinafter "Smith & Wattley").
18. Curry, supra note 15, at 9, col. 2.
19. Id.
20. See T V Topics: Tulane, U.S. - Japan Relations, Washington Post, April 7, 1985.
21. Smith & Wattley, supra note 17, at 1.
22. Curry, supra note 15, at 9, col 2.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Smith & Wattley, supra note 17, at 1.
27. Curry, supra note 15, at 9, col. 2.
28. Id.
29. Ross v. Creighton University, 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
30. Smith & Wattley, supra note 17.
31. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1322.
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emotional distress, and the novel tort of negligent admission. 32 Ross'
amended complaint described "negligent admission" as a hybrid of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress and educational malpractice, "inter-
twining to form the novel tort of 'negligence in recruiting and repeatedly
re-enrolling an athlete utterly incapable-without substantial tutoring
and other support-of performing the academic work required to make
educational progress,' exacerbated by the enrollment of plaintiff in a
school with children half his age and size."
33
The Illinois state court granted Creighton's motion for removal to
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
based on diversity. 4 Creighton then moved for dismissal for failure to
state a cause of action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). 35 On June 14, 1990, the federal district court granted the mo-
tion to dismiss, with prejudice.36
B. The District Court's Holding
The district court held that Ross had failed to prove that any duty
existed under Illinois law requiring a university to "non-negligently ad-
mit, counsel and educate students."3 " The court noted that creating such
a duty would be bad policy.3" As to Ross' contract claims, the court held
that while there might be a contract between the student-athlete and the
university, Ross failed to show any express covenants to educate him.39
Finally, the court rejected Ross' claim for emotional distress, citing the
Illinois requirements of physical impact, zone of physical danger, and
need for an underlying tort basis for recovery."°
C. The District Court's Reasoning
In deciding that Ross had failed to state a cause of action, the dis-
trict court reviewed the state of educational tort law and the policy con-
siderations involved. The court stated that the decision to create an
educational malpractice cause of action is a question of law; the court
must determine whether a duty runs from plaintiff to a defendant.41 The
32. Id. at 1322-23.
33. Id at 1327.
34. Id. at 1322.
35. Id.
36. Ross v. Creighton University, 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1332.
37. Id. at 1328.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1330-31.
40. Id. at 1329-30.
41. Ross v. Creighton University, 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1327.
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court cited as factors in this analysis "[t]he likelihood of injury, the mag-
nitude of the burden of guarding against it, and the consequences of plac-
ing that burden upon defendant."42 The court proceeded to consider
Ross' argument using Illinois state case law, and by examining other
states' educational malpractice law.
In denying Ross' malpractice claim, the court focused on the duty
and proximate cause elements of the negligence analysis. As to duty, the
court agreed with other educational negligence cases that imposing a
duty of care to educate "would put insufferable strains upon educators,
forcing them to 'litigate every suit claiming negligence in the selection of
curriculum, teaching methods, teachers, or extra-curricular activi-
ties.' "" As to proximate cause, the court stated that there is a "practi-
cal impossibility" of proving that a teacher's alleged malpractice caused
the student's learning deficiency."4 In support of this point, the court
pointed to the many factors involved in education, such as the " 'stu-
dent's attitude, motivation, temperament, past experience, and home en-
vironment.' " The court stated that these factors were especially true in
college education "which usually puts the onus of course selection and
attendance on the student."46 Tying the two concepts together, the court
found that both duty and proximate cause failed to meet the foreseeabil-
ity test of tort analysis because the educational institution cannot control
these factors and because of the pressure such a duty would place on
educators.47
In addition, the court noted that because education is provided on
such "an immensely greater scale than other professional services," the
courts would be deluged with litigation and the schools would be "closed
down."4 While denying that this reason alone justified denial of the tort
claim, the court reasoned that the anticipated flood of litigation "shows
the disutility of the proposed remedy."49 The court concluded that "[i]f
poor education (or student laziness) is to be corrected, a common law
42. Id. (citing Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 112 Il1. 2d 378, 98 Ill. Dec.
1, 5, 493 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (1986) (quoting Lance v. Senior, 36 Ill. 2d 516, 224 N.E.2d 231,
233 (1967))).
43. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1328 (quoting Wilson v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 310,
274 N.W.2d 679, 686 (1979)).
44. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1328 (citing Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District,
47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379, (1979)).
45. Id.
46. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1328.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1329.
49. Id.
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action for negligence is not a practical means of going about it."50
Having dispensed with educational malpractice, the court addressed
Ross' response to Creighton's motion to dismiss, in which Ross argued
that because his case was "so unique and egregious" the court should
allow a new, sui generis cause of action for the benefit of college ath-
letes. Ross requested that "a special tort be created for the benefit of
student athletes, or more precisely for the benefit of student athletes
whose academic performance would not have qualified them to be stu-
dents had they not been athletes."52 Ross argued that this claim did not
involve classroom methodology, but involved the question of whether he
should have been admitted to college, and whether, once admitted,
Creighton had a duty to truly educate him rather than "just maintain his
eligibility for basketball."5 3
The court responded negatively to this argument as well. The court
maintained that such a sui generis tort must have some basis in the com-
mon law. 4 Having reviewed the judicial condemnation of educational
malpractice, and holding that it would not create such a tort, the court
refused to take what it viewed as the additional step of creating this new
tort of negligent admission." The court also pointed to other policy con-
siderations. First, "[s]chools would be forced to undertake the delphic
science of diagnosing the mental condition of potential recruits."56 Sec-
ond, the court saw no reason to create this tort just for student-athletes,
but believed it should be available to all tuition paying students. 7 Fol-
lowing this point, the court felt that such a tort duty would "endanger
the admissions prospects of thousands of marginal students, as schools
scrambled to factor into their admissions calculations" the potential
damages of a future negligent admissions claim. 8
The court denied Ross' contract claim for the same policy reasons
stated in denying his tort claim. The court stated that "otherwise, any
educational malpractice claim could be repleaded as a contract claim." 59
In addition to relying on the policy considerations presented in the tort
context, the court refused to utilize the implied covenant of good faith
50. Id.
51. Ross v. Creighton University, 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1330.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Ross v. Creighton University, 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1330.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1331.
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and fair dealing to imply any terms to provide Ross with adequate educa-
tional opportunity.' Ross alleged that Creighton provided inadequate
tutoring, did not afford him a reasonable opportunity to take advantage
of the tutoring services, and refused to allow him to "redshirt," not play
basketball during his first year of eligibility in order to catch up academi-
cally and adjust to college life.6" The court declined to utilize the implied
covenant based on its belief that the court is not institutionally compe-
tent to supervise "the relationship between colleges and student-ath-
letes," or to create a new relationship between them.62 In deciding this,
the court stated that it "believes it should leave the supervision of college
athletics to private regulatory groups such as the NCAA, which presum-
ably possesses the staff and expertise to carry out the job."63
III. MALPRACTICE LAW: THE FRAMEWORK
A malpractice action is a claim of professional negligence, and the
proponent of such an action must assert and prove the four elements of
tort negligence: duty, breach of duty, proximate causation, and dam-
ages." Whether a duty exists between two parties is a question of law for
the court to decide upon an analysis of a series of factors that determine
whether a relationship between two parties is socially important, involves
foreseable harm, and is capable of being analyzed within parameters that
clearly define the obligations owed between the parties.65 The breach of a
60. Id
61. Ross v. Creighton University, 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1331.
62. Id at 1332.
63. Id.
64. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 30
at 164-165 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON).
65. In Raymond v. Paradise Unified School District, 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847
(1963), the court gave a thorough definition of duty, stating:
An affirmative declaration of duty simply amounts to a statement that two parties
stand in such relationship that the law will impose on one a responsibility for the
exercise of care toward the other. Inherent in this simple description are various and
sometimes delicate policy judgments. The social utility of the activity out of which
the injury arises, compared with the risks involved in its conduct; the kind of person
with whom the actor is dealing; the workability of a rule of care, especially in terms
of the parties' relative ability to adopt practical means of preventing injury; the rela-
tive ability of the parties to bear the financial burden of injury and the availability of
means by which the loss may be shifted or spread; the body of statutes and judicial
precedents which color the parties' relationship; the prophylactic effect of a rule of
liability; in the case of a public agency defendant, the extent of its powers, the role
imposed upon it by law and the limitations imposed upon it by budget; and finally,
the moral imperatives which judges share with their fellow citizens- such are the
factors which play a role in the determination of duty.
Id. at 8, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52.
SPORTS LAW
duty is a question of fact, focusing on the actor's conduct.66 Proximate
causation involves both factual and legal elements. The conduct that
breached the duty must have actually caused the harm and be within
legal limitations of causation. 67 Finally, damages requires proof of harm
to a legally recognized interest that can be translated into a monetary or
other remedial award.68
Malpractice actions can be brought against doctors, lawyers, ac-
countants, architects, and engineers. 69  The standard of care required of
these professionals is known as "the skill and knowledge normally pos-
sessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar
communities."7 If a professional holds himself out as an expert or spe-
cialist, the standard of care will be the common standard of that spe-
cialty.7 Where a particular field has various schools of thought, the
practitioner is held to the common standards of the school to which he or
she adheres.72 While tort law recognizes differing professional ap-
proaches, schools of thought cannot be capriciously created. Writing in
the medical malpractice context, Professor Prosser stated that a
" 'school' must be a recognized one within definite principles, and it must
be the line of thought of a respectable minority of the profession."7 "
Even between recognized schools of thought, stated Prosser, there are
usually "minimum requirements of skill and knowledge" which any
practitioner in a profession must possess.74 The standard of care in mal-
practice lawsuits is usually established through expert witness testimony
of a practitioner in the field.7"
In addition to the reasonable actor approach, the standard of care
may also be set forth in a statute. Tort law requires that the statute
express a standard of care intended to cover the harm in question and the
class of plaintiff involved. In such cases, the duty has been determined as
"negligence per se. '"76
66. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, at 164.
67. Id. at 165.
68. Id.
69. Id. at § 32, at 185-86.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
71. Id. Comment b.
72. Id. Comment f.
73. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, § 32, at 187.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 188-89.
76. Id. § 36, at 220-26.
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IV. AN OVERVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
A. Cases From the Public School System
Courts have dealt with the concept of educational malpractice in the
public school context entirely on policy grounds. In one case involving a
claim of educational malpractice the court summed up its approach by
stating:
[I]t may very well be that even within the strictures of a tradi-
tional negligence or malpractice action, a complaint sounding
in 'educational malpractice' may be formally pleaded. Thus,
the imagination need not be overly taxed to envision allegations
of a legal duty of care flowing from educators, if viewed as pro-
fessionals, to their students. If doctors, lawyers, architects, en-
gineers and other professionals are charged with a duty owing
to the public whom they serve, it could be said that nothing in
the law precludes similar treatment of professional educators.
Nor would creation of a standard with which to judge an edu-
cator's performance of that duty necessarily pose an insur-
mountable obstacle .... As for proximate causation, while
this element might indeed be difficult, if not impossible, to
prove in view of the many collateral factors involved in the
learning process, it perhaps assumes too much to conclude that
it could never be established. This [point in the analysis] would
leave only the element of injury and who can in good faith deny
that a student who upon graduation from high school cannot
comprehend simple English . . . has not in some fashion been
'injured.'
The fact that a complaint alleging 'educational malprac-
tice' might on the pleadings state a cause of action within tradi-
tional notions of tort law does not, however, require that it be
sustained. The heart of the matter is whether.., as a matter of
public policy [courts should] entertain such claims. We believe
they should not."
Courts denying claims of educational malpractice have emphasized
three distinct policy reasons for declining to find a duty. One has been a
protective attitude toward the public school systems, from which most
educational malpractice actions stem. Thus, in Peter W. v. San Fran-
cisco Unified School District,78 where a high school awarded a student a
77. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443-44, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979).
78. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
[Vol. I11
SPORTS LAW
diploma despite his inability to read, the court expressed sympathy for
the school district, stating:
Few of our institutions, if any, have aroused the controversies,
or incurred the public dissatisfaction, which have attended the
operation of the public schools during the last few decades.
Rightly or wrongly, but widely, they are charged with outright
failure... according to some critics they bear responsibility for
many of the social and moral problems of our society at large.
Their public plight in these respects is attested in the daily me-
dia, in bitter governing board elections, in wholesale rejections
of school bond proposals, and in survey upon survey.79
Amplifying these concerns, a second policy consideration to which
the courts have referred is the social and financial problems that the pub-
lic schools face because their budgets are not within their control. This
concern was a factor in Hunter v. Board of Education of Montgomery
County,8 ° where a student was allegedly misdiagnosed through educa-
tional tests and required to repeat the first grade. In Hunter, the court
spoke about the "extreme burden which would be imposed on the al-
ready strained resources of the public school system"'" were a tort action
allowed. In Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, the court
mentioned that schools "are already beset by social and financial
problems which have gone to major litigation, but for which no perma-
nent solution has yet appeared. The ultimate consequences, in terms of
public time and money, would burden them-and society-beyond
calculation." 2
Courts have also considered a belief that the courts are not institu-
tionally competent to judge educational standards. This view stresses the
differences of opinion over educational methods within the education
profession and among people within the United States.83 In Donohue v.
Copiague Union Free School District, 8 4 the court spoke at length about
this factor and concluded that educational decisions "rested in the pro-
fessional judgment and discretion of the chancellor, the board of educa-
79. Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
80. 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582 (1982).
81. Id. at 484, 439 A.2d at 584.
82. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861.
83. In Peter W., the court wrote that "[u]nlike the activity of the highway or the market-
place, classroom methodology affords no readily acceptable standards of care, or cause, or
injury. The science of pedagogy itself is fraught with different and conflicting theories of how
or what a child should be taught, and any layman might - and commonly does - have his
own emphatic views on the subject." Id. at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
84. 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
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tion and, ultimately that of the Commissioner of Education, rather than
in the courts .... Recognition in the courts of this cause of action would
constitute blatant interference with ... school administrative agencies." 5
The plaintiff in Donohue, a student who, like the plaintiff in Peter W,
received a high school diploma despite being unable to read and write,
sued the school district for educational negligence. The court dismissed
Donohue's case.
Beyond these policy issues of duty, courts have also emphasized a
belief that determining the proximate causation behind a student's fail-
ure to learn involves too many non-school related external factors to
allow analysis. The Ross opinion reiterated these factors, such as atti-
tude, motivation, past experience and home environment.
Thus, the courts have refused to allow educational malpractice
claims no matter how outrageous, damaging, and preventable the wrong
that the student suffered. Perhaps the most disturbing educational mal-
practice case dismissed by the courts was Hoffman v. Board of Education
of the City of New York 6 In Hoffman, a kindergarten student, Daniel
Hoffman, was tested by a certified clinical psychologist employed by the
New York City School District. The examination determined that Hoff-
man had an intelligence quotient ("I.Q.") of seventy-four and the psy-
chologist recommended that Hoffman be placed in classes for the
mentally retarded. 7 The psychologist, however, was unsure of the re-
sults because the child suffered from a speech defect that made it difficult
to assess his mental level based on the primarily oral intelligence tests
administered.8" Because of this uncertainty, the psychologist recom-
mended that Hoffman be retested in two years.8 9
Hoffman was enrolled in classes for the mentally retarded, and
although his academic progress was monitored by twice yearly academic
testing, he was never given the I.Q. retest recommended by the psycholo-
gist.9 Twelve years later, after being enrolled in a vocational high school
for the mentally retarded, Hoffman's mother demanded that he be
retested.91 The retest found that Hoffman had an I.Q. of ninety-four, and
85. Id. at 445, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (citing James v. Board of Educa-
tion, 42 N.Y.2d 357, 366-67, 366 N.E.2d 1291, 1297-98, 397 N.Y.S.2d 934, 941-42 (1977)).
86. 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
87. Id. at 123-24, 400 N.E.2d at 318, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
88. Id. at 124, 400 N.E.2d at 318, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
89. Id.
90. Hoffman v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 124, 400
N.E.2d 317, 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (1979).
91. Id. at 124, 400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
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was not retarded.92
Hoffman sued the school district, claiming negligence in the original
testing and in the failure to retest him in two years. 93 He claimed that he
suffered injury to his intellectual and emotional well being, and that his
placement in mentally retarded classes reduced his ability to obtain
employment.
94
Hoffman won and was awarded $750,000 damages. 95 The appellate
division affirmed the judgment of negligence based on the school dis-
trict's failure to retest Hoffman. That court would have remanded the
damages award had Hoffman not agreed to accept a reduced judgment of
$500,000.96 The New York Court of Appeals, however, overturned Hoff-
man's judgment, stating that a cause of action for educational malprac-
tice "should not, as a matter of public policy, be entertained by the courts
of this State."'97 The dissent of three justices agreed with the appellate
division that the case involved affirmative negligence that was the proxi-
mate cause of Hoffman's injuries, and that his recovery should stand. 98
Hoffman exemplifies the rigidity of the courts' refusal to allow
claims of educational negligence. In Hoffman, the issue was not one of
educational policy. No difficult choices or borderline interpretation had
to be made. No significant money had to be expended. The school dis-
trict simply failed to follow through on the recommendations of a testing
specialist who was hired specifically for the function of assessing educa-
tional needs.
B. The Extent of Educational Malpractice in College Sports
Whether defined through suits brought against universities, studies
of athletic graduation rates, or academic studies of the college athletic
system, ample evidence exists showing that athletes involved in revenue
producing sports are not receiving the same education and making simi-
lar academic progress as the rest of the student body. Researchers and
recent events point to active misfeasance on the part of coaches who do
not want to lose players to academic ineligibility, boosters99 who enjoy
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 125, 400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
95. Hoffman v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 125, 400
N.E.2d 317, 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979).
96. Id.
97. Id. Whereas most states call their highest court the Supreme Court, the highest court
in New York is called the Court of Appeals.
98. Id. at 127, 400 N.E.2d at 321, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
99. A booster is a college sports enthusiast who may have no other affiliation with the
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unsanctioned and unethical relationships with college athletes, and ad-
ministrators who either actively or tacitly participate in athletic
exploitation.
1. The Lawsuits
Over the past decade, athletes and others affiliated with college
sports have filed a variety of lawsuits alleging educational malpractice.
In Echols v. Board of Trustees of the California State University and Col-
leges, 10 ("Echols") seven former student-athlete basketball players who
played at California State University at Los Angeles sued the California
State College Board of Trustees in tort and contract for educational mal-
practice. The lawsuit did not define the harm in terms of the students'
academic achievement, but rather in terms of access to university educa-
tional services denied to the students.' 0 ' The students alleged that they
were instructed to receive academic counseling solely from the athletic
department coaches and were specifically prohibited from receiving
counseling from the usual academic counselors. 102 The students also al-
leged that they were counseled by the coaches to take primarily physical
education courses in order to avoid losing their athletic eligibility.'03 The
students further claimed to have been instructed to repeat courses they
had already passed and to accept passing grades in courses they never
attended. '4
In settling the lawsuit before trial, the plaintiffs in Echols received
compensation for educational expenses that they had personally in-
curred, repayment of student loans that they were fraudulently induced
to take, a trust fund to pay for future educational expenses if the athletes
chose to return to college, and over $10,000 each in punitive damages.0 5
In another case which focused national attention on college athletic
university. Boosters can be alumni, but are often community business people who feel that
supporting the local university athletic programs helps create a good business image. Boosters
organize parties, fund raising drives, and other social events revolving around support for the
university athletic program. Boosters also entertain prospective athletic recruits, provide gifts
and money to players and coaches, and attempt to influence the athletic program in various
ways. See Frey, Boosterism, Scarce Resources, and Institutional Control: The Future of Ameri-
can Intercollegiate Athletics, in SPORT AND HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 3, 115-29.
100. Echols v. Board of Trustees of the California State University and Colleges, No. C-
266,777 (Ca. Super. Ct., L.A. County, filed Oct. 22, 1979) (hereinafter "Echols") (discussed in
Note, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Application of Contract Theory, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 96, 109-11.
101. Id. at 110.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Note, supra note 100, at 110 n.88.
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exploitation in the 1980s, Jan Kemp, an English professor at the Univer-
sity of Georgia who taught in the school's Developmental Studies pro-
gram, was awarded $2.57 million in back pay and damages after being
fired from the university for speaking out against educational abuses to
reward revenue-producing athletes."°6 According to trial testimony, the
university lowered its admission standards in order to admit athletes,
promoted athletes from its remedial education program even though they
were not achieving passing grades, and were giving athletes more than
the permitted four quarters to complete the Developmental Studies Pro-
gram. 107 The damage award included $1.5 million punitive damages
against the University Vice President for Academic Affairs, and $800,000
against the Developmental Studies Director.'"8 The record did not have
any evidence of the athletes receiving any compensation."°
Another case brought in the 1980s illustrates how athletic exploita-
tion may begin well before the college level. In Jones v. Williams," ° the
mother of a Detroit public school student claimed that after the school
had diagnosed her son as having learning difficulties and had placed him
in a school for slow learners, the school district subsequently removed
him from the special school and enrolled him in a regular junior high and
high school to take advantage of his basketball talent."' The complaint
stated that after Curtis Jones graduated high school, he was "academi-
cally carried" for two years at North Idaho Junior College as part of a
plan for him to achieve eligibility to play at the University of Michi-
gan. "2 Jones never made it to Michigan, however, as he suffered a
mental breakdown while attending junior college which he attributed to
other students' teasing him about his illiteracy."'
Unlike the plaintiffs in Echols, 4 Jones received no compensation
for his claims. The court denied the suit against the Detroit school dis-
trict based on sovereign immunity," 5 and denied the suit against the jun-
106. L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 1986, § 3, at 1, col. 5.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 172 Mich. App. 167, 431 N.W.2d 419 (1988).
111. Id. at 170, 431 N.W.2d at 422.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Echols, supra note 100.
115. Jones v. Williams, 172 Mich. App. 167, 172, 431 N.W.2d 419, 422. Sovereign Immu-
nity is the doctrine that states the government cannot be sued unless it consents to be sued. In
this case, although at the time of trial Michigan had repealed its immunity, Jones' cause of
action had occurred before Michigan had repealed its immunity, and the court held he could
not sue.
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ior college for lack of jurisdiction." 6
2. The Studies
Various formal and informal studies have been conducted to mea-
sure the academic progress of student athletes at big-time sports schools.
These studies have focused on graduation rates, grade point averages,
study time, and test scores of student athletes compared to the general
student population.
In one extensive study of 2091 athletes, conducted over a ten year
period at Colorado State University, a Division IA"IT school, the re-
searchers concluded that these athletes "scored lower than nonathletes
on the measures most commonly used to assess educational attainment:
They entered with poorer academic backgrounds, they received lower
grades than their nonathletic peers, and fewer of them graduated.""'
The study made two other findings. First, as between scholarship and
non-scholarship athletes, scholarship athletes fared worse in academic
performance. Second, the researchers found evidence that "athletes in
the male revenue sports of football and basketball have a relatively low
probability of receiving an education compared to nonathletes or athletes
in other sports," because of the excessive demands of their sports and
because the competitiveness of their sports causes coaches to recruit
solely for athletic talent rather than academic ability.119 In contrast to
revenue-producing sports, however, the study noted that academic
achievement by athletes in minor, non-revenue-producing sports was
similar to that of the general student population. 20
In an NCAA study of graduation rates of athletes and non-athletes
from schools in the Big Eight conference, the researchers focused on stu-
dents who entered and graduated in a five year period.' 2 ' Studying the
1980 through 1985 period, only the University of Nebraska had a higher
overall percentage of athletes graduate than the general population.,22
In the revenue-generating sport of football, however, all the schools had
116. Id. at 426.
117. Division IA is the most competitive ranking within the NCAA football structure. See
Note, The Student-Athlete Right to Know Act" Legislation Would Require Colleges to Make
Public Graduation Rates of Student-Athletes, 16 J.C. & U.L. 287, 292 n.34 (1989).
118. Purdy, Eitzen, and Hufnagel, Are Athletes Also Students? The Educational Attainment
of College Athletes, in SPORT AND HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 3, 221-34, at 229-31.
119. Id at 231.
120. Id
121. Note, Achieving Educational Opportunity Through Freshman Ineligibility and Coach-
ing Selection: Key Elements in the NCAA Battlefor Academic Integrity of Intercollegiate Athlet-
ics, 14 J.C. & U.L. 383, 387 (1987) (citing BIG EIGHT GRADUATION RATES).
122. Id
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lower graduation rates among the players, with the extreme examples of
Oklahoma State, University of Oklahoma, and University of Colorado,
which graduated only 16%, 31% and 27%, respectively, of their football
players in the five year period.1 23 These rates were between 40 and 51
percentage points lower than the general student population.'
24
An NCAA study of the Southwest Conference showed that only
17% of senior basketball players who played regularly graduated in
1982.125 At the University of Texas at Austin, a Southwest Conference
member school, only 39% of football players and 18% of basketball
players who entered school between 1975 and 1981 earned degrees.'
2 6
The graduation rate for the general student population was 54%. At
Memphis State University, between 1973-83, only six of fifty-eight bas-
ketball players graduated.1
27
Another recent NCAA study of the work habits and time demands
of student athletes showed that during their sports' season college basket-
ball and football players spend thirty hours per week training for their
sport, which is more time than they spend on preparing for and attending
classes combined. 2 ' The athletes missed an average of two classes per
week.129 The study showed that even in the off-season the players spend
more time on their sport than preparing for classes.' 30 Football and bas-
ketball players reported that they felt they were not reaching their aca-
demic potential due to the demands of their sport.
13 1
Although this NCAA study reports that student-athletes spend
more time playing and practicing than studying, other studies and anec-
dotal reports from players claim that the thirty hour per week demand is
vastly understated. 3 2 A recent book on college sports mentions a Loui-
siana State University study that found varsity athletes spend up to fifty
hours per week on their sport. 133 The author also cites a Sports Illus-
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Note, supra note 117, at 303 (citing Sanoff, Classroom Crackdown on College Athletes,
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Jan. 24, 1983, at 76).
126. Id. (citing Sanoff, College Sports'Real Scandal, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Sept.
15, 1986, at 63).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 299 (citing Commission's Study of Student-Athletes Released, NCAA NEWS,
Dec. 5, 1988, at 1, col. 1).
129. Id.
130. Note, supra note 117, at 299 (citing Commission's Study of Student-Athletes Released,
NCAA NEWS, Dec. 5, 1988, at 1, col. 1).
131. Id.
132. See infra notes 133-35.
133. M. SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS, INC., at 302 (1990).
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trated article that covered a week spent with a University of Wisconsin
football player, which included fifty-one hours of football related activ-
ity. '34 Isiah Thomas, a professional basketball player who played basket-
ball at Indiana University, claimed that college athletes spend eight to
ten hours a day on their sport.
35
In addition to these studies, other informal reports from people affil-
iated with college sports reveal the lack of academic standards for college
athletes. University of New Mexico President William Davis stated,
"[o]ur recruits were recruited to be athletes, not students. It was never
the expectation that they'd get.., out of bed at 8 o'clock to go to class
and turn in their assignments."' 36 From 1970-1980 the athletic depart-
ment at the University of Southern California maintained separate ad-
missions powers, admitting 330 athletes in that decade who did not meet
the general USC requirements. 1
37
V. THE ROLE OF THE NCAA IN REGULATING COLLEGE SPORTS
As the regulatory body of competitive college sports, the NCAA has
established rules of conduct in everything from recruiting methods to
academic standards to dates of accepting bowl and playoff bids. The
NCAA additionally has created punishments for violations of its rules.
These punishments sanction both the schools and the athletes by prohib-
iting televised games, disallowing bowl and playoff participation, sus-
pending student eligibility to play, and requiring reimbursement of
money won in bowl or playoff competition.138 While these punishments
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Note, supra note 100, at 100 n.20 (citing Axthelm, The Shame of College Sports,
NEWSWEEK, Sept 22, 1980, at 54, 56).
137. See Waicukauski, The Regulation of Academic Standards in Intercollegiate Athletics,
1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 79, 88 (1982) (citing University of Southern California, Academic Con-
duct, Admission, Advisement and Counseling of Student Athletes at the University of South-
ern California: A Report to the USC Community, (Oct. 12, 1980) at 9).
138. See NCAA BYLAW, art. 19, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL 1990-91. The NCAA regu-
lations passed in the mid-1980's are commonly referred to as the "Death Penalty." The
"Death Penalty" is imposed when the NCAA finds that a "major" violation of its rules has
occurred. A major violation is one that "provide[s] an extensive recruiting or competitive
advantage" to a school. Id. at 19.02.2.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL 1990-91. A major
violation may be caused by repeated secondary violations, those that provide "only a limited
recruiting of competitive advantage and that is isolated or inadvertent in nature." Id. at
19.02.2.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL 1990-91. The minimum penalty for a major violation
includes a two-year probationary period, a one-year prohibition on coaches' off-campus
recruiting visits, one year of sanctions prohibiting bowl or playoff competition, one year of
television sanctions, and termination, suspension, or reassignment of all university staff mem-
bers involved in the misconduct. Id. at 19.4.2.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL 1990-91. What
conduct constitutes a secondary or a major violation is decided by the NCAA Committee on
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are formidable, they do not provide a remedy for the student athlete who
has been denied an education by a negligent university. The student-
athlete suffers the loss of television and bowl exposure for his athletic
talents along with the university, but has no recourse under the NCAA
rules to receive the educational commitment owed under his or her ath-
letic scholarship. A student athlete who has used up his or her eligibility
to play has no recourse either, and has no further years of an academic
scholarship to pursue an education.
A. The NCAA View of the Student-Athlete
According to the NCAA, the college athlete is a student first and an
athlete second. The NCAA Constitution contains "The Principle of Stu-
dent-Athlete Welfare," which states that "intercollegiate athletics pro-
grams shall be conducted in a manner designed to protect and enhance
the physical and educational welfare of student-athletes."1 39 It also con-
tains "The Principle of Sound Academic Standards," which proclaims
that "student-athletes shall be an integral part of the student body. The
admission, academic standing and academic progress of student-athletes
shall be consistent with the policies and standards adopted by the institu-
tion for the student body in general."'" Although education is at the
core of the NCAA's purpose, the NCAA has never guaranteed an edu-
cation or provided a remedy for a student who has been educationally
mistreated. The NCAA also leaves evaluation of student-athlete pro-
gress up to the individual school. 4 ' What it has done is implement rules
to attempt to create some academic integrity.
42
B. The Reform Effort of Propositions 48 and 42
In 1983, the NCAA passed a proposition, to be effective in 1986,
that required incoming athletes to have at least a 2.0 grade point average
in a "core curriculum" and a 700 Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT")
score or a 15 score on the American College Test ("ACT") in order to be
Infractions. NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.1.3, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL. For a thorough cri-
tique of the NCAA death penalty rules see Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion's Death Penalty: How Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985 (1987).
139. NCAA CONSTITUTION, art. 2.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL 1990-91.
140. lId at 2.4.
141. To be eligible to play, the NCAA requires that a student-athlete be in "good academic
standing" and making "satisfactory progress toward a baccalaureate" degree. The meaning of
both these terms is "determined by the academic authorities who determine the meaning of
such phrases for all students of the institution." NCAA BYLAW, art. 14.4.1, 4.2, reprinted in
NCAA MANUAL 1990-91.
142. See infra notes 143-57.
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eligible to play as freshmen. 143 The alternative under Proposition 48 was
to allow an athlete to be recruited and given an athletic scholarship, but
be unable to play until satisfactory grades were achieved after the fresh-
man year of college." As might be expected, Propositon 48 has resulted
in many freshmen sitting out their first year, but some people within col-
lege sports believe that once admitted, the student-athlete inevitably be-
comes eligible to play for his sophomore year. 145
Proposition 48 has been criticized from many directions, including
charges that it is racist.' 46 However, prominent black sociologist Harry
Edwards of the University of California at Berkeley has taken the posi-
tion that the Proposition 48 requirements are too lenient, and that Propo-
sition 48 fails to create goals for athletes once they are in college. 147 One
author asserts that to achieve a 700 on the SAT a student need correctly
answer only 13 out of 60 math questions, and 24 out of 85 verbal ques-
tions.148 The same author also asserts that cheating on the SAT has in-
creased since the passage of Propositon 48, primarily in the form of
having substitute students take the exam for athletes.'49
In 1989, the NCAA strengthened Proposition 48 by enacting Propo-
sition 42, which prohibits schools from offering any scholarships to non-
qualifying freshmen.' 50 Through a recent amendment to Proposition 42,
however, these students may receive institutional financial aid from non-
athletic university sources.' 5 ' Given the availability of booster money
and university financial aid, Proposition 42 may have no effect in keeping
academically deficient student-athletes out of college sports.
Another reform element of Proposition 48 was the requirement that
student athletes achieve satisfactory grades in a "recognized baccalaure-
ate degree program."' 5 2 According to one author, the result of this rule
has been the creation or takeover of majors by the athletic departments
in order to offer athletes a recognized degree program controlled by the
143. NCAA BYLAW, art. 14.3.1.1(a)-(b) reprinted in NCAA MANUAL 1990-91.
144. See Note, supra note 117, at 306-07.
145. See M. SPERBER, supra note 133, at 224.
146. H. EDWARDS, Educating Black Athletes, in SPORT AND HIGHER EDUCATION, supra
note 3, 373-84, at 377-78.
147. Id. at 381.
148. M. SPERBER, supra note 133, at 218.
149. Id. at 224.
150. See Sullivan, Scorecard, The Battle of Dallas, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 22, 1990, at
7. The rule change is found in NCAA BYLAW, art. 14.3.2.1 and 3.2.1.1, reprinted in NCAA
MANUAL 1990-91.
151. NCAA BYLAW art. 14.3.2.1 and 3.2.1.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL 1990-91.
152. NCAA BYLAW art. 14.4.2., reprinted in NCAA MANUAL 1990-91.
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coaches and athletic department personnel.15 3 One example is the crea-
tion of sports management programs taught and controlled by coaches.
These programs are only the most recent manifestation of the "hideaway
curriculums" provided to preserve the eligibility of athletes.' 54
Recently, the NCAA has continued its reform efforts by taking steps
to shorten certain sport seasons and practice time required of players. '
5 5
Effective in 1992, the college basketball season will be cut from twenty-
eight games to twenty-five.' 56 Additionally, the basketball and football
practice seasons will be shortened. 57 The new NCAA Executive Direc-
tor, Dick Schultz, has candidly expressed his belief that the NCAA and
college sports have image as well as substantive problems, and has ex-
pressed his desire to increase academic responsibility to the student-ath-
letes. ' Realizing these goals, however, will pit the academic reform
elements within the NCAA against the athletic and financial interests,
who have already shown strong resistance to change. "9
For all of its reform-minded rulemaking, the NCAA has only placed
some obstacles in the path of the most flagrant abuses in college sports.
The NCAA has neither replaced the university-chosen curriculum with
its own, nor instituted its own tests to measure student-athletes' aca-
demic progress. The NCAA has chosen to punish by witholding sports
exposure, but not through enforcing academic duties. In the face of a
long history of rule-breaking, the NCAA has simply created more proce-
dural rules for universities to follow in the recruiting of athletes, while
not fundamentally changing the competitive forces that drive college
sports, such as competition for football bowl bids and playoff berths in
the NCAA basketball tournament, as well as increased television expo-
sure. The admission of partial-qualifiers for the freshman year only
tempts the schools to make sure that the recruits receive passing grades
to be eligible to play the following year, beginning the typical cycle of
phony academic standards. Why the NCAA expects these rules to be
effective is unclear, especially where academic cheating can simply be
shifted to or shared with the high school level to keep athletes eligible to
153. M. SPERBER, supra note 133, at 283.
154. Id. at 283-84.
155. Robbins, NCAA Convention; Delegates Say: Shorten Basketball Season, Give Recruits
Grad Rates, L.A. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, § C, at 7, col. 1.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Asher, Schultz Proposes Vast NCAA Changes; Makes Announcement at Convention,
Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1990, § D, at 5.
159. Id. See also Rhoden, Harmony and Dissonance as NCAA Meets, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12,
1990, § A, at 28, col. 1.
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enter college. Finally, it has not created a compensation scheme to see
that athletes receive some education, much less graduate, if they can
prove that the university failed to provide them with meaningful courses
and academic help. In short, relying on the NCAA to effectively govern
college sports and protect the student-athletes' education, as the Ross
court did, reflects a lack of appreciation for the depth of corruption in
college sports, the history of university attempts to circumvent NCAA
rules, and the failure of the NCAA to enforce the students' right to an
education.
VI. CRITIQUE OF THE Ross DECISION
Against this backdrop of legal cases and studies, revelations of col-
lege sports scandals, and the minor reform efforts of the NCAA, the fed-
eral district court refused to allow Kevin Ross to proceed with proof that
Creighton University had been negligent in admitting him and re-enroll-
ing him for four years until his eligibility expired, despite its knowledge
of his academic weakness and lack of progress. In doing so, the court
ignored the social importance of education compared with the relative
unimportance of college basketball, exaggerated the difficulties involved
in determining educational malpractice, equated big-time college athlet-
ics with the problems of the public school system, and ignored the de-
fenses available to Creighton University in a tort action.
A. The Imbalance of the Risk of Harm to Student-Athletes to the
Purpose of College Athletics
One factor that enters the judicial balancing act to determine tort
duty is the relationship between the "social utility of the activity out of
which the injury arises, compared with the risks involved in its con-
duct." Applying this risk/benefit factor to college athletics shows a
drastic imbalance in priorities. The social utility of big-time college
sports is entertainment for spectators and television audiences, 161 and
reputation enhancement for the university. This benefit carries a very
low priority compared to the risks involved: the exploitation of young
student-athletes who are warehoused but not educated and given an illu-
sory benefit of a meaningless scholarship. Athletes are harmed to the
extent that they do not develop knowledge or skills that they can use in a
career after they graduate, except the very small percentage who play
160. Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847,
851 (1963). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965).
161. M. SPERBER, supra note 133, at 345. See also HART-NIBBRIG AND COTTINGHAM:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLLEGE SPORTS, 11, 33-51, 61-63 (1986).
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professional sports. 162 They lose because they gain no monetary rewards
for their services, unless they are willing to engage in violations of
NCAA rules.' 63 Finally, they may be emotionally damaged when their
days of playing have ended and they face the reality of having no usuable
skills or direction.164
Professional athletes have acknowledged a difficult transition pro-
cess when their playing careers have ended, leading professional teams
and players unions to establish counseling and career guidance pro-
grams.165 All these risks are inherent in athletic exploitation, and were
involved in the Ross case.
From this utility-risk perspective, the benefits of big-time college
sports hardly justify the risks. Rather than evaluate the relative impor-
tance of college sports, however, the Ross court focused instead on the
perceived problems of causation and forseeability of harm.
B. The Exaggerated Difficulties of Proving Educational Malpractice
Faced with a claim that Kevin Ross had been given a curriculum
filled with sports classes and ceramics, the federal court launched into a
detailed evaluation of the complexity of determining causation in educa-
tional malpractice cases, focusing on teaching methodologies and the
many factors involved in successful learning.' 66 In doing so, the court
ignored the forms of negligence alleged in the case and the forms most
commonly found in college athletics: the failure of the university to pro-
vide any curriculum at all in the fundamental areas of learning, the pres-
sure exerted by athletic departments to monopolize athletes' time, and
the pressure exerted by athletic departments to pass student-athletes who
162. Charles Grantham, a former college player, coach, and administrator, and current
Executive Director of the National Basketball Association ("NBA") Players Association,
wrote "[y]et, the N.B.A. will draft just 54 college players in its annual draft. By season's end
only about 35-40 rookies will remain on active rosters." Grantham, It's Time to Give College
Players a Cut, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1990, § 8, at 10, col. 2.
163. The amount of money a college athlete can receive from any source is tightly regulated
by the NCAA rules. See NCAA BYLAW art. 15 and art. 16, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL
1990-91.
164. For a good discussion of the psychological effects athletes encounter upon retirement
see Wolff, Views of Sport." What Happens When the Cheering Stops, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1989,
§ 8, at 10, col. 2.
165. The post-career educational program created by Northeastern University, and ac-
cepted by the Boston Bruins hockey team for its retired players, is described in Hammonds,
Training for Life After the Game is Over, BusINESS WEEK, Mar. 14, 1988, at 74. The New
York Giants football team also provides a post-career educational program for its players. See
Sciullo, From Black and Blue to the Blackboard for New York Giants, Chicago Tribune, Apr.
9, 1989, § Sports, at 14.
166. See Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1328.
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are not performing at a passing level in substantive courses. From the
Jan Kemp remedial studies lawsuit at the University of Georgia,1 67 to the
surveys and reports about athletes time commitments,1 68 to the
Echols169 case involving repeated physical education courses, precedent
shows that the immediate problem in college athletics is a lack of any
academic standards required of athletes, not a complex interplay of
forces. Athletes are either not given any substantive courses, or fraudu-
lently passed through courses, or given a phony curriculum through the
athletic department.
To determine negligence in this area does not require a difficult anal-
ysis. The proof would be a factual determination of what type of curricu-
lum was offered the student, who served as teachers and as advisers, what
academic advice was given, and whether an athlete actually passed
courses, all judged against professional standards of education. These
standards could be state accreditation standards, the standards of the
university itself, or state or local public school special education stan-
dards, where relevant. 7° The professional teacher training curriculum
to which all state certified teachers are exposed is another source of
standards. 17
Where an athlete was given a curriculum devoid of any courses in-
volving reading, writing, science, or math, educational negligence would
be implicit. Where an athlete scoring well below the university minimum
in incoming grades and test scores is admitted and given none or minimal
tutoring, educational negligence is likely. At the least, the average grades
and test scores of the student body show the level of competiton faced by
the student-athlete, which sets the standards for the university. A stu-
dent-athlete functioning academically at a junior high school reading
level, or lower, cannot be expected to read and perform competitively at
the college level.
Where athletes scoring well below university minimum require-
ments are admitted and given no further diagnostic testing to determine
skill levels or learning disabilities, such evidence supports a claim of neg-
ligence. Sequentially levelled reading diagnostic tests exist and are em-
ployed as a basic part of teaching reading.172 These materials allow a
teacher to test a student's reading level by having the student read pro-
167. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 100.
170. See infra note 177.
171. See Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by Incompetent
of Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 641, 730-31 (1978).
172. See W. MILLER, TEACHING ELEMENTARY READING TODAY, 355-67 (1984).
[Vol. I11
SPORTS LAW
gressively more difficult passages, until the student cannot fluidly read
through a passage. Comprehension tests and word recognition tests sup-
plement this procedure.'73 The results give the teacher a very close ap-
proximation of the reading level of the student. 174 Such tests are not
time consuming, expensive, or difficult to administer. They can be re-
peated to confirm results and to measure reading progress.'17
Standards for testing and evaluating students with learning difficul-
ties exist in every state that receives federal funds under the Education of
the Handicapped Act. 176 This legislation requires states to identify stu-
dents who are having learning difficulties, test them using accepted psy-
chological tests administered by educational psychologists, and prepare
an individualized educational program ("I.E.P.") for those students
found to have a learning disability. 77 The I.E.P. process is a comprehen-
sive evaluation procedure, and provides a framework of due process
rights and interaction between a student, parents and professional edu-
cators. 8 Local school districts have extensive experience with these
procedures, 17 9 and though this legislation does not apply to colleges,
there is no reason that universities could not employ the same methods of
testing with low-achieving student-athletes. This would follow accepted
educational practice and be consonant with the tort concept of being
judged by the community standards of the profession.
Another sign of negligence might be entire curriculums designed
and taught by the athletic coaches, especially where the coach has no
background in the subject taught. Coaches have an inherent conflict of
interest when they have the power to evaluate athletes on whom their
success may depend. Coaches serving as academic advisers would also
be an indicator of negligence, especially where the coaches have no coun-
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. One sequentially developed reading assessment program including sight word vocabu-
lary and reading comprehension is SILVAROLI, CLASSROOM READING INVENTORY, (4th ed.
1982). The Silvaroli test takes approximately 12 minutes to administer to each student. Id. at
4.
176. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-476 (1990).
177. See BIEHLER, SNOWMAN, PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO TEACHING 180-195, (5th ed.
1986).
178. For a detailed explanation of the IEP process, see LERNER, LEARNING DISABILITIES,
THEORIES, DIAGNOSIS, AND TEACHING STRATEGIES 59-97 (4th ed. 1985). See also Note, Ed-
ucation-Board of Education v. Rowley: The Supreme Court Takes a Conservative Approach to
the Education of Handicapped Children, 61 N.C.L. REV. 881, 885 & n.33 (1983).
179. For articles and notes which mention state guidelines See Elson, supra note 171, at 738
n.370. See also Note, Hunter v. Board of Education & Doe v. Board ofEducation-No Cause of
Action for Educational Malpractice Against Public School Teachers and Psychologists, 42 MD.
L. REV. 582, 590-591 n.54 (1983). See also Note, supra note 178, at 887 n.44.
1991]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
seling degree or training, and do not act as counselors to students other
than athletes.
These forms of negligence do not require the court to evaluate diffi-
cult issues of educational methods. The testing for basic skill levels, de-
sign of curriculum from within a range of professionally accepted
alternatives, provision of adequate study time, and honest evaluation of
student performance are all capable of review by state standards and pro-
fessional judgment.
C. The Court's Erroneous Analogy to the Public Schools
In the Ross decision, the court borrowed heavily from public school
negligence cases and concluded that the flood of litigation that would
ensue would force the schools to shut down. 180 Equating the business of
college sports, with its television contracts, multimillion dollar stadiums,
and highly paid coaches, and the educational resources possible through
such revenues, with the strapped conditions of many urban public school
districts is an invalid comparison. Universities have no legal obligation
to create major sports programs. 1 ' They do so in order to provide en-
tertainment 8 2 and name recognition for the school, and for these reasons
ought not to be shielded from liability. The endeavors of college athletes
bring revenues to the university, with which it can purchase insurance or
create a reserve to pay such claims, rather than just building larger and
more modern stadiums. Further, the tort proposed by the Ross case
would be limited to college athletes, a class much smaller than the entire
student body, and thus a smaller pool for potential litigation.
Universities involved in revenue-producing sports seek athletes from
around the country, even around the world.' They have complete con-
trol over the type of student athletes they recruit, and some programs
have excellent academic records. ' 84 For those that choose to recruit aca-
180. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1329.
181. College sports began as a recreational outlet for "keeping the spirit pure" in the 19th
century American college. It grew in popularity over the years and has emerged as a major
enterprise today, but school's participate only by choice, and not all schools choose to keep
up. See HART-NIBBRIG AND COTrINGHAM, supra note 161, at 3, 18-29.
182. See supra note 161.
183. In 1988, Seton Hall University recruited Andrew Gaze, a 23 year-old Australian pro-
fessional basketball player. Gaze arrived at Seton Hall in October, just in time for the start of
the basketball season, and left after Seton Hall was eliminated from the NCAA tournament.
His academic program consisted of ethics, first-aid, youth activities, and creative movement.
M. SPERBER, supra note 133, at 235.
184. Duke University and the University of Notre Dame have successful athletic programs
that are also well respected for high graduation rates and an emphasis on educational achieve-
ment. See Note, supra note 117, at 303-04.
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demically deficient athletes there is no public policy reason to protect
them from liability. Unlike the public schools, these universities are
under no mandate to educate every student who wishes to enter, espe-
cially those that don't meet the university published requirements. Like
a business, they assume this risk of failing to educate when they accept
the student and seek to exploit the student's talent.
D. The Court Ignored the Defenses Available to the University in a
Malpractice Litigation
The Ross court pointed out that, unlike younger age groups, at the
collegiate level students have more responsibility in procuring their edu-
cation."' Although an academically deficient student should not be ex-
pected to have the same ability to learn on his own as a student who
meets university requirements, the idea that the student-athlete is an
adult does go toward creating a duty to participate and give effort in
learning. To this end, the university can invoke the defenses of contribu-
tory or comparative negligence to defend itself against an educational
malpractice claim.
In order to succeed in asserting educational malpractice, a student
would have to withstand evidence that he or she did not attend class,
missed tutoring sessions, failed to complete assignments, showed a non-
cooperative attitude, and didn't participate in class or tutoring
sessions. 186
Evidence of this could be kept in dated records of the teachers and
tutors involved with the student. Periodic academic testing would also
provide a record of academic progress, and periodic evaluation sessions
with written evaluations of the testing results and teacher evaluations
would supply a continuing record of educational progress and prove that
the student was honestly apprised of his performance.
In states which follow the theory of contributory negligence, proof
of negligence on the student's part is a total defense, precluding any re-
covery by the student." 7 In states which allow a pure comparative negli-
gence defense, the student's recovery is diminished by the student's
percentage of blame.' Many states follow a modified version of com-
parative negligence, where the student-plaintiff can recover diminished
damages as long as his negligence is either less than 50% or no more
185. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1328.
186. Elson, supra note 171, at 751.
187. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, § 65 at 461.
188. Id. § 67 at 471-72.
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than 50%. 19 Student negligence found to be above these levels would
result in no recovery. Both of these systems provide the student with a
cause of action and offer protection to the school as well.
Instead of proving that the integrative process of learning makes it
impossible to determine causation, the focus on student participation af-
fords the university a strong defense without denying the student a cause
of action. The student-athlete who has no intention of studying and put-
ting forth the effort to learn will be denied recovery, and will be dis-
suaded from attempting the lawsuit by counsel that objectively evaluates
the case. Thus, a flood of litigation will be avoided, and those students
with justifiable arguments will not lose an opportunity to gain a remedy.
VII. THE UTILITY OF EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE LAWSUITS ON
THE NCAA: THE CASE STUDY OF THE BRADLEY BILL
Above all, the NCAA wishes to avoid any outside regulation of its
control of college athletics."9 The effect that outside governmental influ-
ence can have on the NCAA policy and rule making functions has been
demonstrated recently during the consideration and passage of legislation
titled "The Student Athlete Right to Know Act" in the United States
Congress (The "Bradley Bill").19' This legislation, sponsored by Senator
Bill Bradley, a former National Basketball Association player and college
athlete, and Representative Tom McMillan, another former college and
professional basketball player, requires that athletic recruiters from uni-
versities that receive federal funds present the school's graduation statis-
tics to potential recruits as a necessary part of the recruiting process.192
The legislation was motivated by the Senate's belief that the NCAA was
neglecting academic values,1 93 and it includes in its introductory lan-
guage "the academic performance of student athletes, especially student
athletes receiving football and basketball scholarships, has been a source
of great concern in recent years." '94
The Bradley Bill requires that graduation statistics of each school's
athletic team members who received athletic scholarships must be bro-
ken down by categories of sport, race and gender.' 95 Graduation rates
for the university as a whole must be presented as well, broken down by
189. Id. at 473.
190. See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
191. Pub. L. No. 101-542 (Nov. 8, 1990).
192. Id. at § 104(e)(1)(F)(2).
193. See Smith, An Academic Game Plan for Reforming Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics,
67 DENV. U. L. REV. 213, 267 (1990).
194. Pub. L. No. 101-542 § 102(4).
195. Id. at § 104(e)(1)(A).
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race and gender. 96 The legislation requires other forms of graduation
information concerning athletes who received scholarships, such as grad-
uation rates over the past four years and degrees attained.' 97 This infor-
mation must be reported to the United States Department of Education,
and shown to all student-athletes recruited by the school, as well as their
parents and school guidance counselors.' 98
Manifesting a desire to avoid governmental regulation, the NCAA
responded to the Bradley Bill while it was still under consideration by
the Senate.' 99 At its 84th annual convention, held in January, 1990, the
NCAA passed its own version of the Bradley Bill, requiring member
schools to reveal graduation rates to recruits.2 °" The NCAA had been
collecting such information for years, but had never passed a rule to
make it public.2° ' Commenting on the proposed rule as he introduced it
to the NCAA convention, Texas Christian University Chancellor Wil-
liam Tucker stated "[1]et me put the matter in academic terminology.
We either take this action for ourselves or we shall have it done for us.
And if it is done for us, so to say, it will be done to us."2 °2 Many other
conventioneers echoed this desire to avoid governmental intrusion into
NCAA affairs.2"3
The NCAA reaction to the Bradley Bill reveals a number of impor-
tant points. One is that as a political organization, the NCAA can be
motivated to make meaningful reforms through external pressure. An-
other is that the NCAA collects data and has reform ideas that are stifled
from within its ranks. Finally, the NCAA only acted when it was certain
that the Student Right to Know Act would pass, and then attempted to
have the legislation withdrawn.2 °"
The Bradley Bill may not have a strong effect on high school ath-
196. Id. at § 104(e)(I)(D).
197. Id. at § 104(e)(l)(E).
198. Id. at § 104(e)(1)(F)(2).
199. See Smith, supra note 193, at 267.
200. Rabun, NCAA Agrees to Make Graduation Data Public, United Press International,
Jan. 9, 1990.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. "It's the worst thing that can happen," said the Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, former
president of Notre Dame. Sherman, NCAA Feeling the Pressure From Congress, Chicago Trib-
une, Jan. 7, 1990, at 1, Zone C. "It's better for us to be regulated by ourselves than to be
regulated by something we have no control over," said University of Colorado President
Gordon Gee. id. One opposite view was stated by Big Ten Conference Commissioner Jim
Delany, who said, "I can't say I'm enthusiastic about government getting involved, because
I'm not ... [but] [i]f it takes external pressure to get our house in order, then that's fine by
me." id.
204. See Smith, supra note 193, at 267 n.268.
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letes with dreams of becoming professionals and might not have influ-
enced Kevin Ross' college experience. A tort lawsuit, with the
opportunity it would provide to thoroughly expose the treatment of a
college athlete, and assess damages, would be a much more effective re-
sponse to athletic program abuses. However, the Bradley Bill is an exam-
ple of external pressure being brought on the NCAA to reform college
athletics. Like the Bradley Bill, allowing Ross' lawsuit to go to trial
would have subjected the NCAA to national attention and possible em-
barassment that it desperately does not want. The public forum of a
lawsuit delving into how a college basketball player was educationally
treated by his school could have been the external pressure needed to
push through continued reforms at future conventions, including specific
guidelines for academic testing of student-athletes, remedial programs
for academically weak athletes, regular monitoring of academic progress,
counseling and other programs to help assure that a college athlete has
an opportunity to achieve an education while he or she is able to take
advantage of having an athletic scholarship. The NCAA might even in-
stitute a remedy of a continuing scholarship for a student-athlete who
could prove academic negligence. If the NCAA responded to the Ross
suit with such detailed and serious reforms, it could make such suits rare
in the future.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In denying a cause of action for educational malpractice, the court
in Ross lost an opportunity to provide a forum and bring the power of the
judicial system to bear on an area of education that urgently needs re-
form. Although college sports has a regulatory body in the NCAA, its
history of protecting athletes rights is woefully inadequate, and even the
current reform climate has not addressed a student-athlete's right to be
anything but culpable along with the athletic department. Further, as a
political organization, the reform efforts within the NCAA could expire
at any time, with athletic directors regaining power lost in recent years to
university presidents, or university presidents losing the will to reform.
With the growth of cable television and the growing international
appeal of American sports,2 °5 especially football and basketball, 2" there
205. College football has already gone international, with Boston College playing the Army
Academy in the Emerald Isle Classic in Dublin, Ireland, on Nov. 19, 1988. A crowd of 42,525
fans attended. Facts on File World News Digest, Dec. 31, 1988.
206. The National Football League, ("NFL") according to a plan of developing interna-
tional marketing, has played exhibition games in England, Germany, Montreal and Tokyo for
the past few years. These games have been called the "American Bowl." See NFL's American
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appears to be only increasing interest in expanding the entertainment po-
tential of college sports, which leads to student exploitation. As a busi-
ness endeavor for the entertainment of the television viewing public,
college sports deserves no immunity from liability. The sacrifice of these
years of educational potential for student-athletes is not justified, and tort
lawsuits could provide the pressure needed to compel meaningful reform,
as well as balance the scales of power between the athletes and the
institution.
Edmund J. Sherman*
Bowl Expanded, United Press International, Apr. 10, 1990. See also Denver, Seattle to Open
Bowl Series in Tokyo, L.A. Times, Apr. 12, 1990, § P, at 10, col. 6. Future sites for these
games may include Moscow. Id. The NFL also has plans for an international league, the
World League of Professional Football, to begin play in 1991. The plans call for franchises in
Barcelona, Montreal, Mexico City, London and other international locations as well as Ameri-
can cities. See Birmingham Gets World League Team, L.A. Times, Apr. 17, 1990, § P, at 10,
col. 3. See also Schmidt, Cheerful Gathering in London, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1991, § 1, at 39,
col. 4. In what one magazine termed "a giant marketing test," the Utah Jazz and the Phoenix
Suns of the NBA opened the 1990-91 season with two sold out regular-season games in Japan.
The event was planned by the NBA along with its Japanese business partner, C. Itoh and Co.,
because Japanese fans no longer wanted to watch exhibition games. See McCallum, East Meets
West: The NBA Showed How to Export a Product to Japan, Where the Jazz and Suns Split
Regular-Season Wins, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 12, 1990, at 42. While the NCAA at
present has no similarly ambitious plans, the potential may develop as the professional leagues
prove the economic viability of international play.
* This note is dedicated to my wife, Stacy, who now knows more about college sports
than she ever desired.
1991]

